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BOOK REVIEWS
CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE
WITHOUT TRIAL. By Donald ]. Newman. Boston: Little, Brown &
Co. 1966. Pp. xx.vii, 259. $8.50.

Conviction is the second volume to appear in The American
Bar Foundation's Series on the Administration of Criminal Justice
in the United States,1 though it will be the fourth of five volumes
when the series is complete. The series is the outgrowth of field
studies conducted by The American Bar Foundation in 1957 in
Kansas, Michigan and Wisconsin.
Professor Newman's volume, as its full title indicates, treats those
cases that are disposed of through a formal judgment but without
a full-scale trial on the merits. The two significant forms of disposition are the plea of guilty, either to the offense charged or to a
lesser included offense, and the judicial judgment of acquittal that
bars further prosecution of the matter. Both dispositions tend to be
lost sight of in traditional studies of the system of criminal law
administration.
As Professor Newman points out at length, the courts have cooperated in creating practical inducements to pleas of guilty. The
primary inducement is toleration, and in many instances encouragement, of plea bargaining between the prosecuting attorney and
the defense attorney; as a reward to the defendant for saving the
state the expense of a trial, the prosecutor accepts a plea of guilty
to a lesser-included offense, or sometimes to an offense that bears
no legal or logical relationship to the offense originally charged. 2
Plea bargaining cannot exist without at least the tacit approval of
the judge who accepts the plea tendered by the defense attorney
(though technically by the defendant himself) once the prosecuting
attorney indicates his agreement. The secondary inducement is the
fact that in most cases the defendant who pleads guilty is more likely
to receive probation, a lower minimum or maximum sentence, or
both, depending on the sentence structure in the criminal code, than
the defendant who is convicted following trial.8 The high incidence
of pleas of guilty bears witness to the efficacy of this free enterprise
system in which admissions of guilt are traded for the time and
expense of trial.
The system of plea bargaining is indispensable to the criminal
law process, for reasons both practical and theoretical. The practical
reasons are based on statistics.4 The caseload on the criminal docket
1. The earlier volume is LAFAVE, .ARREsT: THE DECISION
CUSTODY (1965), reviewed in 64 MICH. L. REv. 1181 (1966).
2. See ch. 6.
3. See pp. 99-104.
4. See pp. 3·6.
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is about as heavy as the judicial system can handle; increases in the
number of cases presented for adjudication will only produce additional delay in the trial of those cases. But the cases tried represent
only about IO per cent of the cases in which an indictment or information is presented. If even half of the 90 per cent of the defendants
who now plead guilty should request trial, the judicial system would
break down from overload. Though in the abstract a society should
immediately respond to an increase in the number of cases to be tried
by a corresponding increase in the numbers of judges to try them and
courtrooms in which they may be tried, as a concrete matter the
community responds only very slowly to these pressures. Therefore,
what results is an increased delay in trying criminal cases and a
more cursory trial of the cases once they reach the head of the
docket. As an illustration of the process, one need only look at the
strains evident in the federal court system because of the flood of
habeas corpus applications from state prisoners and the counterpart
strain on state appellate procedures as state prisoners endeavor to
exhaust their state remedies.
The plea bargaining system is also necessary from the point of
view of criminal law theory. Rigid definitions of criminal conduct
and mandatory prison terms, whether achieved through mandatory
minimum sentences for crimes like first-degree murder or sale of
narcotics, or through exclusion of certain offenses from the list of
crimes in which probation is possible, require plea bargaining, for
nobody wishes to apply them in even a majority of cases that fit the
legislative definitions. However, the necessity of imposing a prison
sentence can be avoided5 only through entry of a judgment for
some other offense. At other times the individualization of criminal
justice that flows from plea bargaining gives formal recognition to
the "respectable" social status of the defendant, the "disrepute" of
the victim or complainant, the need of the defendant for special
hospitalization or other treatment, or the normality of the formallyprohibited conduct within the subculture to which the defendant
belongs. 6 In still other instances, plea bargaining is a means of recognizing "imperfect" defenses when the substantive criminal law
in form seems to offer a choice only between complete criminality
and complete freedom from criminal responsibility. 7
The function of individualizing justice is also performed in some
instances through outright acquittal, when even a conviction of a
lesser-included or a petty offense appears too harsh. 8 Certain acquittals, however, are motivated not by a desire to protect the individual
5.
6.
7.
8.

See
See
See
See

pp. 112-17.
pp. 117-25.
pp. 125-30.
chs. 10-12.
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defendant against the harshness of the criminal law, but rather by
a desire to control law enforcement practices.9 Functionally, this
use of acquittal by judicial fiat bears a close relationship to the
invocation of exclusionary rules of evidence to discipline law enforcement authorities. 10 If a judge finds a constitutional or evidentiary basis for excluding evidence that is the key to a conviction of
the defendant, he makes it possible, as a practical matter, for the
defendant to avoid conviction. But there is not always evidence
subject to suppression. In that event, if a judge believes that a criminal statute should not be invoked at all, or should not be utilized
against the defendant or the group to which he belongs, or if he
believes that the police have overstepped the bounds of decency in
dealing with the defendant or other citizens in the same group or
situation, he may enter a judgment of acquittal. If he chooses, he
may state informally that this judgment is not intended primarily
to benefit the defendant, but instead is directed toward the police
and prosecutor. In almost every state, the trial judge may do this
with impunity, for the state rarely can resort to appeal or superintending appellate control to obtain a ruling that the trial judge
acted improperly, and even if it can, the individual defendant almost always has the protection of the double jeopardy concept
against retrial on the pleading under which he was acquitted.11
Thus Professor Newman's study shows that plea bargaining and
judicial acquittals exist because without them our present system
of criminal law administration could not operate justly, if, indeed,
it could function at all. It is futile to talk of abolishing either procedure unless we prefer the alternative of complete breakdown of the
system. There are, however, lessons here for those who would draft
a modern criminal code. Mandatory minimum sentences for any
crime should be eliminated entirely. No class of offenders should
be declared by the legislature ineligible for probation or parole.
"Imperfect" defenses should be recognized formally as mitigating
the degree of the offense that has been committed in form. The
court should be permitted to reduce the punishment classification
for the offense, or in some instances dismiss the proceedings because
the offense is trivial in comparison with the hardship that will
result from conviction and punishment. The possibility should exist
at any stage of the proceeding to substitute civil commitment for
criminal prosecution. To the degree that revisions of this nature
are made, the need for plea bargaining and judicial acquittal will
diminish and the institutions themselves atrophy.
9. Professor Newman covers this in Part V, pp. 172-96.
IO. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (search and seizure); Mallory v. United
States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) (confessions obtained during unlawful detention); Nardone
v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937) (wiretap evidence).
11. See pp. 141-48.
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Professor Newman's background in sociology12 has been especially conducive to a presentation that places the techniques of
procedure against a backdrop of social reality. No traditional presentation by a lawyer committed to the methodology of case analysis
could serve so well to challenge legislator, judge and attorney. I
hope that this work will be closely read, indeed used as a handbook,
by those who are interested in reform both of substantive and
adjective criminal law.
I am troubled, however, by one aspect of this work and its companion volumes: the material that they present as if it were current
is in fact rapidly becoming obsolete.13 This was true to a degree in
Professor LaFave's book; it is even more evident here. That these
books were not produced and published in 1960 rather than from
1965 to 1967 is regrettable. Criminal procedure has changed dramatically within the last five years; one may say that the "half-life"
of cases decided and materials gathered before 1960 has already
elapsed. True, Professor Newman has endeavored to compensate
for one major development after The American Bar Foundation
study was completed, that is, the decision of Gideon v. Wainwright 14
and its aftermath. Plea bargaining in the past often could and did
take place in the absence of counsel, though the unfairness of this
in at least some cases was recognized by the Supreme Court years
before Gideon was decided. 15 After Gideon this is not proper in
any felony case unless the defendant has waived his right to counsel
-and waiver ought to be restrictively viewed. The Gideon rule
probably is also applicable by now to any case tried in a court of
record, and may be applicable in the near future to any case pleaded
to in any court. The required participation by counsel in the plea
bargaining process, and the appearances entered by lawyers who
have not heretofore taken criminal cases, must certainly affect the
plea bargaining process. Plea bargaining will no doubt continue,
but both in externals and in content it may vary markedly from the
practices described by Professor Newman on the basis of the 1957
survey.
One other significant development since Professor Newman's
manuscript was written may also spell the demise or impairment
of the plea bargaining system. As a result of the many Supreme
Court decisions governing details of state procedure under the aegis
of the fourteenth amendment due process clause, and especially
12. He is professor of social work at the University of Wisconsin and holds a
joint appointment in the Law School of that University.
13. I am also bothered by the relatively small number of illustrations and the
frequency with which the ones which are used reappear without significant reinterpretation. The repetition diminishes their impact.
14. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
15. E.g., DeMeerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947).
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Miranda v. Arizona16 and the expansion of its holding which one
may expect in future terms of the Court, 17 it is no longer, in one
sense, the defendant who is on trial, but rather the state and its
employees, particularly the police. Because what has been done improperly by the police cannot be redone correctly, there is an increasing possibility that errors by policemen, and perhaps by prosecutors or judges, will in fact immunize a defendant against successful prosecution. If so, defense counsel probably will, and granted
the existence of this growing body of constitutional law, should insist on a trial of the case so that he may present issues that would
be foreclosed by a guilty plea. In this event, the percentage of cases
disposed of through pleas will decline rapidly from the present 90 per
cent. In short, Supreme Court activity may impel a breakdown of the
system that the practices described in Conviction have come into
being to prevent. Therefore, within a very few years we may perforce have to treat Professor Newman's study as only history, the
history of an institution as thoroughly outmoded as other procedural
traditions scrapped through judicially-created fourteenth amendment common law.
B. ]. George, Jr.,
Professor of Law
The University of Michigan

16. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
17. For example, creating a derivative rule of evidence applicable to whatever is
discovered as a result of leads in the defendant's otherwise inadmissible confession.

